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(e) The military importance of recommendation (d) should be impressed on the British Minister at Peking and the Consul-General at Shanghai.
(f.) In view of the uncertainties of the situation, the immediate withdrawal of all British nationals from the Yangtse is recommended, and we suggest that the other countries concerned should be urged to order a similar withdrawal.
(9.) From a military point of view there are advantages in making any demand in regard to Nanking to the Nationalist Government rather than to the Chinese military Commander-in-Chief.
(h.) We adhere to our previous recommendation that, if possible, reliance should be placed on Japan for the protection of British and international interests North of the River Yangtse. If this is impossible we should be glad to have further political guidance in regard to the importance which His Majesty's Government attach to the retention of Peking and Tien-tsin. For the local protection of the international concessions at Tientsin the minimum reinforcement should be one mixed Brigade, but this does not allow for the maintenance of communications (over 30 miles long) to the sea or for the protection of the Legation at Peking.
(Signed)
BEATTY.
G. F. MILNE.
H. TRENCHARD.
5
APPENDIX I.
Copy of Cypher Telegram from Commander-in-Chief, China, to Admiralty
(No. 940.) (State.)
(Received 5:33 P.M., April 3, 1927.)
REFERENCE measures for enforcement of ultimatum.
At private meeting to-day, Sunday, with Admiral Williams, we both agreed: (a) destroy Wusung Forts; (b) bombard Yangtse Forts one by one; (c) stoppage of troop movement and destruction of arsenals meant taking sides in Chinese war. This might prevent concerted action, as other Powers would probably not agree.
At second meeting French and Japanese Admirals stated that their Governments had not yet asked their views.
Following proposals were made: (d) Seizure and destruction of Wusung Forts; (e) bombardment of Yangtse Forts; (f) destruction of Hankow and Canton arsenals; (g) seize or destroy Chinese Fleet; (h) seize customs revenue Shanghai only; (2) bombardment of military points such as barracks, &c.; (j) blockade and seizure of Chinese shipping.
Admirals recommended action as follows in order of importance: British (d), (e), (f), (9) did not agree to (h). America (h), (d), (e), (f), (g). French (j), (f), (h), (g), (d), (e). Japanese (d), (g), (e), (ƒ), (i) had no opinion re destruction of Canton arsenal. We all considered it undesirable to destroy Shanghai arsenal on account of risk to civilians and danger to American buildings near by. 2230/3.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W. 1, April 4, 1927.
i
NATION.
APPENDIX II.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF ADMIRALS.
(Telegram No. 940 from Commander-in-Chief, China.)
(d)
(@)
(0
S
(h)
Seizure and
Destruction of
Wusung Forts.
Bombardment of
Yangtse Forts.
Destruction of Hankow and
Canton Arsenals.
Seize or Destroy
Chinese Fleet
©
Seize Customs
Revenue.
Bombardment of Military Points.
e.g., Barracks, &c.
Blockade and
Seizure of Chinese Shipping.
3
(5)
GREAT BRITAIN
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
U.S.A.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(3)
(1)
No opinion No opinion
recorded
recorded*
No opinion No opinion recorded recorded*
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Y es
FRANCE
(5)
(6)
(2)
(4)
(3)
No opinion recorded❤
Yes
(1)
Yes
Yes Yest
Yes
JAPAN
(1)
(8)
(4)
(2)
No opinion recorded*
Yes
(5)
No opinion recorded*
* The distinguishing letter of these expedients is not mentioned in Telegram No. 940 for the respective nations where "No opinion recorded" has been noted above.
† Japanese S.N.O. had no opinion re destruction of Canton Arsenal.
NOTE. All representatives concurred in the undesirability of destruction of Shanghai Arsenal owing to
risk to civilian population and danger to neighbouring American buildings.
Operations Division, April 4, 1927.
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